Perfidious Albion? Britain and the struggle for mastery of Yugoslavia 1941–44: A reexamination in the light of ‘new’ evidence

In November 1943, a report from the principal British mission with General Mihailovic explained that 'great mistrust and apprehension ... derive from the conviction of all Yugoslavs here that the present one hundred per cent support of Partisans by the BBC, including gross misrepresentations of known facts, plus minimum mention of Mihailovic's activities, plus greater material support he believes we give the Partisans ... all add up to mean the British have completely sold Yugoslavia down the river to the Russians'. This extract encapsulates the sentiments of recent revisionism in the interpretation of British policy towards wartime Yugoslavia. The demise of communism following the events of 1989, and the subsequent disintegration of the Yugoslav state, has intensified the debate. This revisionism challenges what is known in the nomenclature as 'received wisdom' concerning the decision firstly to send supplies to the communist-led Partisans and then to abandon the Serb-dominated Cetnik movement of Draza Mihailovic. Briefly, the revisionist thesis postulates that the decision was made by the Prime Minister on the basis of uncritical reports prepared by officers in the field who had influence with him outside the normal official channels. It argues that these briefs were supported by evidence of