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The cascading crises of the novel coronavirus pandemic era are seen, by some observers, as the constitutive components of a broad “polycrisis.” It is a useful term, but, as some have pointed out, while it registers the fact of coinciding crises it does little to explain the interaction of those crises. Indeed, polycrisis is a misleading conceptualization of the pandemic era in part because the cascading character of the present crisis is a function of a shared ultimate cause. What we have been experiencing is best understood as a crisis of capitalism, the result of industrial humanity’s deformed relationship with the natural world. This is more specific than an obvious contending description that would render the present crisis in anthropogenic terms, as a result of human activity. Instead, the present crisis is the product of specific forms of human activity and particular elements of humanity, namely, capital. This being the case, we might speak instead of a broad, structural crisis that is, in turn, experienced as a crisis cascade. This “paradox of polycrisis” has historiographical implications, and this article concludes by suggesting how contemporary historians can confront the crisis and write history for our times.

The importance of mobility in Canada’s history can hardly be overstated. The built waterways, railways, and roadways that allowed for the movement of peoples, goods, and ideas within the country have long been considered cultural icons conveying collective ideas of Canadian identity. Yet, little has been written on the history of the modern construction machines that made this mobility infrastructure possible after Confederation, along with their designers, manufacturers, and operators. This article helps fill that gap by examining the technological development, manufacturing, and commercialization of earthmoving equipment in Canada (especially Ontario) in the 1860s–1920s, a period of great construction activity, including two of the world’s largest civil engineering and earthmoving projects and one of the fastest-expanding road networks in North America. It discusses the role of the federal, provincial, and municipal governments in developing, adopting, and disseminating this technology, and their ultimate reliance on American manufacturers despite the National Policy’s protectionism. This article supports the argument that technological development in Canada during the Second Industrial Revolution was continentally integrated in ways that involved technological dialogue with American companies, associations, and publications. While this manufacturing sector became dominated by American corporations by the First World War, the extent to and manner by which that happened varied depending on the type of machinery and the construction sectors in which they were used. The technological transition from steam-powered machines to electric, gasoline, and diesel motors and how it impacted Canadian manufacturers are also discussed.

The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially claims that Japan had discovered Takeshima (Dokdo) since the seventeenth century, but this article argues that quite to the contrary, Isotakeshima Oboegaki, a primary source that confirms Japan’s recognition of Dokdo as Korean territory, clearly corrects this claim. Isotakeshima Oboegaki’s importance can be explained in three ways. First, Japan’s official position regarding Dokdo wrongly conflates different uses of “Takeshima” depending on historical context and ignores that it was because of a paucity of Japanese sources confirming Japanese ownership over Takeshima (Ulleungdo) and a comparative certainty from the Korean government, forcing a reluctant Bakufu to admit the deficit in historical evidence and order that Japanese fishermen cannot trespass into Ulleungdo. Second, Isotakeshima Oboegaki was not just a document of its time but a key primary source that the Meiji government invoked as undeniable evidence to officially declare in the Dajokan Directive that neither Dokdo nor Ulleungdo were under Japanese sovereignty due to a paucity of evidence. Finally, Isotakeshima Oboegaki terminates Japan’s logic regarding Dokdo because it contradicts the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ claim of “original discovery” regarding Dokdo and Ulleungdo and corrects the mistaken notion of terra nullius.