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Abstract This paper proposes a novel view in the race and causation literature known as “causal agnosticism” about race. Causal agnosticism about race implies that it is reasonable to refrain from making judgments about whether race is a cause. The paper’s thesis asserts that certain conditions must be met to infer that something is a cause, according to the fundamental assumptions of causal inference. However, in the case of race, these conditions are often violated. By advocating for causal agnosticism, the paper suggests a more modest approach to understanding the role of race in causal relationships.

Abstract The generalized selected effects theory of function (GSE) holds that a trait’s proper function is an activity that historically caused its differential persistence or differential reproduction within a population, construed as a collection of individuals that impact each other’s persistence or reproduction chances. Several critics have taken aim at GSE on the grounds that its appeal to populations is either unfit for purpose or arbitrary. Here I revise GSE by articulating a notion of population that is fit to purpose and showing that its selection is not arbitrary but flows from the realist commitments of the selected effects theory itself.

Abstract In recent debates about the replication crisis, two positions have been dominant: One that focuses on methodological reforms and one that focuses on theory-building. This paper takes up the suggestion that there might be a deeper difference in play, concerning the ways the very subject matter of psychology is construed by opposing camps, i.e., in terms of stable effects vs in terms of complexity. I argue that both gets something right, but neither is sufficient. My analysis suggests that the context-sensitivity of the psychological subject matter needs to be front and center of methodological and theoretical efforts.

Abstract Bayesian agents, argues Belot (2013), are orgulous: they believe in inductive success even when guaranteed to fail on a topologically typical collection of data streams. Here we shed light on how pervasive this phenomenon is. We identify several classes of inductive problems for which Bayesian convergence to the truth is topologically typical. However, we also show that, for all sufficiently complex classes, there are inductive problems for which convergence is topologically atypical. Lastly, we identify specific topologically typical collections of data streams, observing which guarantees convergence to the truth across all problems from certain natural classes of effective inductive problems.

Abstract Imagine that we are on a train playing with some mechanical systems. Why can’t we detect any differences in their behavior when the train is parked versus when it is moving uniformly? The standard answer is that boosts are symmetries of Newtonian systems. In this paper, I use the case of a spring to argue that this answer is problematic because symmetries are neither sufficient nor necessary for preserving its behavior. I also develop a new answer according to which boosts preserve the relational properties on which the behavior of a system depends, even when they are not symmetries.

This paper introduces the Snap Hook Methodology, a method implicitly used notably in astrochemistry to indirectly validate and assess the accuracy of computational calculations in the absence of experimental or observational data. We argue that this methodology has a tremendous potential as a substitute for traditional verification and validation standards, when those are not accessible and the reliability of numerical predictions difficult to estimate. Our goal is to give to this method a proper formulation, in order for philosophers of science to enter the debate, and to highlight its interesting features in terms of interdisciplinary facilitation and knowledge transmission. International audience

Abstract Imitating nature is an ever more popular strategy in many fields of science and engineering research, from ecological engineering to artificial intelligence. But while biomimetics and related fields have recently attracted increased attention from philosophers, there has been relatively little engagement with what I suggest we see as their basic epistemological presupposition: that we may acquire knowledge from nature. I argue that emphasizing and exploring this presupposition opens up a new approach to epistemology, based on a shift from a conventional epistemological relationship to nature as object of knowledge to a biomimetic relationship to nature as source of knowledge.

Abstract An influential heuristic for thinking about climate adaptation asserts that “natural” adaptation strategies are the best ones. This heuristic has been roundly criticized but is difficult to dislodge in the absence of an alternative. We introduce a new heuristic that assesses adaptation strategies by looking at their maturity, power, and commitment. Maturity is the extent to which we understand an adaptation strategy’s effects. Power is the size of the effect an adaptation strategy will have. Commitment is the degree to which an adaptation strategy is difficult to test or reverse.