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We learn from our experience but the underlying neuronal mechanisms incorporating past information to facilitate learning is relatively unknown. Specifically, which cortical areas encode history-related information and how is this information modulated across learning? To study the relationship between history and learning, we continuously imaged cortex-wide calcium dynamics as mice learn to use their whiskers to discriminate between two different textures. We mainly focused on comparing the same trial type with different trial history, that is, a different preceding trial. We found trial history information in barrel cortex (BC) during stimulus presentation. Importantly, trial history in BC emerged only as the mouse learned the task. Next, we also found learning-dependent trial history information in rostrolateral (RL) association cortex that emerges before stimulus presentation, preceding activity in BC. Trial history was also encoded in other cortical areas and was not related to differences in body movements. Interestingly, a binary classifier could discriminate trial history at the single trial level just as well as current information both in BC and RL. These findings suggest that past experience emerges in the cortex around the time of learning, starting from higher-order association area RL and propagating down (i.e., top-down projection) to lower-order BC where it can be integrated with incoming sensory information. This integration between the past and present may facilitate learning.

AbstractAt the turn of the seventeenth century, jurists such as Alberico Gentili (1552–1608) and Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), began to advance a novel account of the law of nations (ius gentium) as a law that binds a world of sovereign states. That they would produce such a theory is surprising, however, considering that sovereign states were neither the dominant form of political organization at the time, nor did conventional medieval jurisprudence treat them as the normative standard. This article traces this evolution to a broader transformation in legal interpretation. In an effort to put Roman law on a more rational foundation, jurists such as François Connan (1508–51) and Hugues Doneau (1527–91) connected the origin of law to the unfolding of a certain account of human sociability, with the result that a conception of the state as an autonomous body acquired a normative status within their version of the global legal order. It then argues that we should see Gentili’s work on the ius gentium as part of this tradition. In so doing, the article demonstrates how the innovations of a particular school of legal interpretation, by combining Roman law with a distinctive social theory, contributed to making the sovereign state the legal norm.

We surveyed 150 academic experts on misinformation and identified areas of expert consensus. Expertsdefined misinformation as false and misleading information, though views diverged on the importance ofintentionality and what exactly constitutes misinformation. The most popular reason why people believeand share misinformation was partisanship, while lack of education was one of the least popular reasons.Experts were optimistic about the effectiveness of interventions against misinformation and supportedsystem-level actions against misinformation, such as platform design changes and algorithmic changes.The most agreed-upon future direction for the field of misinformation was to collect more data outside ofthe United States.

Abstract One striking observation in the history of rational choice models is that those models have not only been used in economics but been spread widely across the social and behavioral sciences. How do such model transfers proceed? By closely studying the early efforts to transfer such models by William Riker—a major protagonist in pushing the adoption of game-theoretic models in political science—this article examines the transfer process as one of “translation” by which abstract and mathematical rational choice models were constructed and modified such that they applied to a specific target system in a new domain. In this article, the argument is that to overcome a set of challenges that hampered the straightforward transfer of game-theoretic models into political science, Riker complemented theoretical and conceptual modifications of von Neumann and Morgenstern's game schemes with the use of narratives to turn them into applicable and testable models. As such, those narratives played a crucial role in enabling their transfer and ultimately facilitated the applicability of game-theoretic models in political science.

We study paternalistic preferences in two large-scale experiments with participants from the general population in the United States. Spectators decide whether to intervene to prevent a stakeholder, who is mistaken about the choice set, from making a choice that is not aligned with the stakeholders’ own preferences. We find causal evidence for the nature of the intervention being of great importance for the spectators’ willingness to intervene. Only a minority of the spectators implement a hard intervention that removes the stakeholder’s freedom to choose, while a large majority implement a soft intervention that provides information without restricting the choice set. This finding holds regardless of the stakeholder’s responsibility for being mistaken about the choice set – whether the source of mistake is internal or external – and in different subgroups of the population. We introduce a theoretical framework with two paternalistic types – libertarian paternalists and welfarists – and show that the two types can account for most of the spectator behavior. We estimate that about half of the spectators are welfarists and that about a third are libertarian paternalists. Our results shed light on attitudes toward paternalistic policies and the broad support for soft interventions.

Like in many other countries, wealth inequality has increased in Switzerland over the last 50 years. By providing new evidence on cantonal top wealth shares for each of the 26 cantons since 1969, we show that the overall trend masks striking differences across cantons, both in levels and trends. Combining this with variation in cantonal wealth taxes, we then estimate an event study model to identify the dynamic effects of reforms to top wealth tax rates on the subsequent evolution of wealth concentration. Our results imply that a reduction in the top marginal wealth tax rate by 0.1 percentage points increases the top 1 per cent (0.1 per cent) wealth share by 0.9 (1.2) percentage points 5 years after the reform. This suggests that wealth tax cuts over the last 50 years explain roughly 18 per cent (25 per cent) of the increase in wealth concentration among the top 1 per cent (0.1 per cent). Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 39 (3) ISSN:1460-2121 ISSN:0266-903X