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A “Sleeping Beauty” (SB) in science is a metaphor for a scholarly publication that remains relatively unnoticed by the related communities for a long time; - the publication is “sleeping”. However, suddenly due to the appearance of some phenomenon, such a “forgotten” publication may become a center of scientific attention; - the SB is “awakened”. Currently, there are specific scientific areas for which sleeping beauties (SBs) are awakened. For example, as the world is experiencing the COVID-19 global pandemic (triggered by SARS-CoV-2), publications on coronaviruses appear to be awakened. Thus, one can raise questions of scientific interest: are these publications coronavirus related SBs? Moreover, while much literature exists on other coronaviruses, there seems to be no comprehensive investigation on COVID-19, - in particular in the context of SBs. Nowadays, such SB papers can be even used for sustaining literature reviews and/or scientific claims about COVID-19. In our study, in order to pinpoint pertinent SBs, we use the “beauty score” (B-score) measure. The Activity Index (AI) and the Relative Specialization Index (RSI) are also calculated to compare countries where such SBs appear. Results show that most of these SBs were published previously to the present epidemic time (triggered by SARS-CoV or SARS-CoV-1), and are awakened in 2020. Besides outlining the most important SBs, we show from what countries and institutions they originate, and the most prolific author(s) of such SBs. The citation trend of SBs that have the highest B-score is also discussed.

AbstractTravelling is an activity closely associated with Carolus Linnaeus (1707–1778) and his circle of students. This article discusses the transformative role of studying nature outdoors (turning novices into naturalists) in eighteenth-century Sweden, using the little-known journeys of Carl Bäck (1760–1776), Sven Anders Hedin (1750–1821) and Johan Lindwall (1743–1796) as examples. On these journeys, through different parts of Sweden in the 1770s, the outdoors was used, simultaneously, as both a classroom and a space for exploration. The article argues that this multifunctional use of the landscape (common within the Linnaean tradition) encouraged a democratization of the consumption of scientific knowledge and also, to some degree, of its production. More generally, the study also addresses issues of how and why science and scientists travel by discussing how botanical knowledge was reproduced and extended ‘on the move’, and what got senior and junior students moving.

The new field of the history of knowledge is often presented as a mere expansion of the history of science. We argue that it has a greater ambition. The re-definition of the historiographical domain of the history of knowledge urges us to ask new questions about the boundaries, hierarchies, and mutual constitution of different types of knowledge as well as the role and assessment of failure and ignorance in making knowledge. These issues have pertinence in the current climate where expertise is increasingly questioned and authority seems to lose its ground. Illustrated with examples from recent historiography of the sixteenth to twentieth centuries, we indicate some fruitful new avenues for research in the history of knowledge. Taken together, we hope that they will show that the history of knowledge could build the expertise required by the challenges of twenty-first century knowledge societies, just like the history of science, throughout its development as a discipline in the twentieth century, responded to the demands posed by science and society.

The psychoanalytical case history was in many ways the pivot point of John Forrester’s reflections on case-based reasoning. Yet the Freudian case is not without its own textual forebears. This article closely analyses texts from two earlier case-writing traditions in order to elucidate some of the negotiations by which the case history as a textual form came to articulate the mode of reasoning that we now call ‘thinking in cases’. It reads Eugène Azam’s 1876 observation of Félida X and her ‘double personality’—the case that brought both Azam and Félida to prominence in late 19th-century French science—against a medico-surgical case penned by the Bordeaux physician in the same decade. While the stylistics of Azam’s medical case mirror its epistemic underpinnings in the ‘vertical’ logics of positivist science, the multiple narratives interwoven in Félida’s case grant both Azam and his patient the role of knowledge-making actors in the text. This narrative transformation chimes with the way Azam reasons ‘horizontally’ from particulars to Félida’s singular condition, but sits in tension with his choice to structure the observation along a ‘vertical’ axis. Between the two, we glimpse the emergence of the psychological observation as a mode of writing and thus of thinking in cases.

Many profess faith in the universal rule of deterministic law. I urge remaining agnostic, putting into nature only what we need to account for what we know to be the case: order where, and to the extent that, we see it. Powers and mechanisms can do that job. Embracing contingency and deriving order from powers and mechanisms reduces three kinds of problems: ontological, theological, and epistemological. Ontologically, there is no puzzle about why models from various branches of natural and social science, daily life, and engineering serve us in good stead if all that's happening is physics laws playing themselves out. Also, when universal laws are replaced with a power/mechanism ontology, nothing is set irredeemably by the Big Bang or at some hyper-surface in space-time. What happens can depend on how we arrange things to exploit the powers of their parts. That may be put to significant theological advantage. The epistemological problem comes from philosopher of physics, Erhard Scheibe. Given what we take physics to teach about the universality of interaction, there is just one very large object - the entire universe - to be governed by laws of nature. How then do we ever learn those laws?

By the late-1950s, the Soviet Union acquired a strong position as a world oil exporter, thanks to major discoveries in the Ural-Volga area. The new availability prompted the USSR to greatly increase its exports, especially to West European countries. Such strategy was met with ambivalent reactions, depending on each countryʼs position and status on the world oil scene, as well as on their political and economic needs. In order to transport their oil to strategic areas within the Soviet Union and to Europe, the Soviets devised a project for a colossal pipeline system. This plan caused anxiety at NATO since Russian oil could be wielded as a weapon to weaken the West both militarily and economically. Beside being seen as potentially threatening for the interest of Anglo-American and French oil majors, the considerable amount of cheap oil the pipeline system would carry generated worries about Western Europe becoming dependent on the USSR for its energy. In order to complete the system, however, the Soviets needed considerable amounts of large-diameter steel pipes and equipment, which they had to import from the West. Thus in 1961 the US delegation at NATO proposed a comprehensive embargo of large-diameter pipes in order to delay the systemʼs construction. The proposal met with strong British opposition and a lukewarm attitude by a number of NATO members, and the debate soon came to revolve around 1) the definition of steel pipes as strategic items, and 2) whether a security rationale should be prioritized over an economic one when dealing with the Soviets. In this paper, I argue that the definition of what oil pipes are as technological artifacts, as well as their ultimate content, was ultimately shaped by the NATO debate on the US proposition. What an oil pipe was – or was not – and how it could be used, derived from the struggle to control or suppress commerce with the Soviet Union.

AbstractThe Edward Snowden leaks challenge policy makers and the public's understanding and perspectives on the role of security intelligence in liberal democratic states. This article explores the challenges confronting security intelligence collection by the ‘Five Eyes’ countries – particularly those most affected by the leaks. We argue that the debate now needs to move beyond simplistic notions of privacy vs. security to a more detailed understanding of the policy and ethical dilemmas confronting policy makers and intelligence agencies. To that end, we provide a schematic framework (methods, context and target) to promote a better understanding of the practical, policy and ethical problems for security intelligence collection emerging post Snowden. The framework is a first step in identifying common principles that could be used develop an ethically informed set of policy guidelines to help decision makers better navigate between citizen's two basic rights: security and privacy.

This paper brings together the study of transnational flows in global health and the gendering of technological artefacts. It does so through a case study of vaginal microbicides for HIV prevention, which have commonly been advocated for as a tool for women’s empowerment in parts of the world where HIV is most prevalent, namely sub-Saharan Africa. Drawing on fieldwork in the UK and Zambia, I argue that there is nothing inherently gendered about this ‘woman-controlled’ technology. Combining the notions of scripting and ‘making things public’, I demonstrate the political nature of transnational technology design and testing in the field of sexual health. Rather than framing this in terms of ethical debates, as is frequently the case in studies about the ‘global South’, I ground the analysis in the scripting and de-scripting of technologies and users. By focusing on how things are made public in HIV prevention, I draw attention to the normative, transformative and political potentials of new technologies, such as microbicides, and discuss the implications for their therapeutic success.

Abstract While the fundamental laws of physics are time-reversal invariant, most macroscopic processes are irreversible. Given that the fundamental laws are taken to underpin all other processes, how can the fundamental time-symmetry be reconciled with the asymmetry manifest elsewhere? In statistical mechanics (SM), progress can be made with this question. What I dub the ‘Zwanzig–Zeh–Wallace framework’ can be used to construct the irreversible equations of SM from the underlying microdynamics. Yet this framework uses coarse-graining, a procedure that has faced much criticism. I focus on two objections in the literature: claims that coarse-graining makes time-asymmetry (i) ‘illusory’ and (ii) ‘anthropocentric’. I argue that these objections arise from an unsatisfactory justification of coarse-graining prevalent in the literature, rather than from coarse-graining itself. This justification relies on the idea of measurement imprecision. By considering the role that abstraction and autonomy play, I provide an alternative justification and offer replies to the illusory and anthropocentric objections. Finally, I consider the broader consequences of this alternative justification: the connection to debates about inter-theoretic reduction and the implication that the time-asymmetry in SM is weakly emergent. 1Introduction 1.1Prospectus2The Zwanzig–Zeh–Wallace Framework3Why Does This Method Work? 3.1The special conditions account3.2When is a density forwards-compatible?4Anthropocentrism and Illusion: Two Objections 4.1The two objections in more detail4.2Against the justification by measurement imprecision5An Alternative Justification 5.1Abstraction and autonomy5.2An illustration: the Game of Life6Reply to Illusory7Reply to Anthropocentric8The Wider Landscape: Concluding Remarks 8.1Inter-theoretic relations8.2The nature of irreversibility

International audience; Most philosophers of science do philosophy ‘on’ science. By contrast, others do philosophy ‘in’ science (‘PinS’), i.e., they use philosophical tools to address scientific problems and to provide scientifically useful proposals. Here, we consider the evidence in favour of a trend of this nature. We proceed in two stages. First, we identify relevant authors and articles empirically with bibliometric tools, given that PinS would be likely to infiltrate science and thus to be published in scientific journals (‘intervention’), cited in scientific journals (‘visibility’) and sometimes recognized as a scientific result by scientists (‘contribution’). We show that many central figures in philosophy of science have been involved in PinS, and that some philosophers have even ‘specialized’ in this practice. Second, we propose a conceptual definition of PinS as a process involving three conditions (raising a scientific problem, using philosophical tools to address it, and making a scientific proposal), and we ask whether the articles identified at the first stage fulfil all these conditions. We show that PinS is a distinctive, quantitatively substantial trend within philosophy of science, demonstrating the existence of a methodological continuity from science to philosophy of science.